| 劳动合同法下政企双方的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 李清,葛玉辉,潘莹.劳动合同法下政企双方的博弈分析[J].科技与管理,2011,13(4):84-87. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李清 葛玉辉 潘莹 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海理工大学管理学院,上海,200093
2. 吐哈油田井下技术作业公司,新疆吐鲁番,838202 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究项目，上海市(第三期)管理科学与工程重点学科，上海市教委科研创新重点项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 劳动合同法开始实施以后,政府和企业双方的博弈加剧。企业的抵制规避,政府的监管不力,都使法律的实施效果大打折扣。从如何使企业自觉遵守《劳动合同法》及尽量降低政府监督检查的成本2个层面建立博弈模型,以期《劳动合同法》能够得到预期的执行效果。
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| 关 键 词： | 劳动合同法 政府 企业 博弈 纳什均衡 |
Game analysis on both government and enterprises under the Labor Contract Law |
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| LI Qing,GE Yu-hui,PAN Ying.Game analysis on both government and enterprises under the Labor Contract Law[J].Science-Technology and Management,2011,13(4):84-87. |
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| Authors: | LI Qing GE Yu-hui PAN Ying |
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| Institution: | LI Qing1,GE Yu-hui1,PAN Ying2 (1.Management School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China,2.Tuha Oilfidd Corporation of China Petrolecom,Tulufan 838202,China) |
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| Abstract: | With the background of the Labour Contract Law has been implemented,the game between government and enterprises are increasing.The effect to the implementation of the law has greatly reduced by enterprises’ resistance and government’s lack of supervision. |
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| Keywords: | Labor Contract Law government enterprise game Nash equilibrium |
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