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存在普遍客观的道德原则吗--从道德实在论的观点看
引用本文:江怡.存在普遍客观的道德原则吗--从道德实在论的观点看[J].湘潭师范学院学报(社会科学版),2002,24(3):5-11.
作者姓名:江怡
作者单位:中国社会科学院,哲学所,北京,100732
摘    要:围绕道德的普遍客观性问题,当代西方哲学家们的各种不同观点引发了当代伦理学中的实在论在反实在论的论战。论战的焦点在于:是否存在普遍客观的道德原则?如何解释当代西方的道德现状?虽然实在论观点拥有广大的支持者,但反实在论的看法同样引来了越来越多的赞同者。综合不同哲学家的观点,一种“无道德的”伦理学正在西方兴起。

关 键 词:道德原则  道德实在论  情感主义  道德真理  伦理学  道德理论
文章编号:1009-4482(2002)03-0005-07

Is There Any Impersonal Global Moral Fundamental? From Perspective of Moral Realism
JIANG Yi.Is There Any Impersonal Global Moral Fundamental? From Perspective of Moral Realism[J].Journal of Xiangtan Normal University(Social Science Edition),2002,24(3):5-11.
Authors:JIANG Yi
Abstract:Various views of generality of impersonal moral fundamentals by Western philosophers aroused debate between realism and anti-realism in recent ethics. The very points of the debate are concerned at whether there is any impersonal global moral fundamental and how to explain the present situation of morality in modern Western society. While realist views have been argued by a few of philosophers, more and more philosophers have also approved anti-realist ones. An ethics without morality has been rising up among various views of morality.
Keywords:moral fundamental  moral realism  emotivism  moral truth
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