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1.
Klas Roth 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2019,51(13):1372-1380
AbstractKant argues that we have a duty to perfect ourselves morally and promote the happiness of others. He also argues that we have an innate propensity to evil. Our duty to perfect ourselves suggests that we struggle with our innate propensity to wilfully deviate from doing our duty. And we do this when we struggle against the depravation of our heart, namely our propensity to reverse ‘the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice’, namely, our propensity to wilfully comply with the principle of self-love and override the moral law. It seems, however, that education does not enable those concerned to fulfil their duties. It seems, instead, that education basically makes them efficacious with regard to desired ends and with the devised means. It seems, too, that education does not necessarily make it possible for those concerned with duty to perfect themselves morally and help others to do the same, which in turn suggests that those concerned are not being enabled to make themselves ‘as conscientious as possible in [their] moral self-examination’. I argue that education ought to enable those concerned to cultivate their moral strength to do so and enable others to do the same. 相似文献
2.
G. Felicitas Munzel 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2019,51(13):1351-1360
AbstractTo perfect human beings with an innate propensity for radical evil is a formidable task. Kant explicitly says that the propensity for evil is not eradicable; it is rooted in human nature, specifically in the human power of choice-making. The task is to reorient the natural order of choice-making (which derives its maxim from an object of the inclinations), to the moral order that takes the moral law as its supreme principle. I explicate the role of a specific capacity of the human subjective side of judging in this process; namely, of ‘mind’ in its sense as Gemüt. While human willing and choice-making are subject to the influence of sensuousness (the inclinations and passions), Gemüt is a capacity of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) that allows the human subject to enjoy the feeling of being pleased in the fulfillment of duty. Its four specific aesthetic preliminary concepts of responsiveness to concepts of duty – moral feeling (as respect for the law), conscience, love of humanity, and respect for oneself (self-esteem) – must be cultivated in order to make objective practical reason also subjectively practical. Thereby one secures a bulwark against the ineliminable propensity for evil whose first effect is to destroy inner moral integrity. 相似文献
3.
Pablo Muchnik 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2019,51(13):1381-1391
AbstractIn a note introduced into the second edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1794), Kant assigns a systematic role to the General Remarks at the end of each Part of his book. He calls those Remarks, “as it were, parerga to religion within the boundaries of pure reason; they do not belong within it yet border on it” (RGV 6:52). As Kant sees them, the parerga are only a “secondary occupation” that consists in removing transcendent obstacles. This paper is skeptical of Kant's view. It proposes an alternative account, according to which the parerga are essential to our moral education, since they force human reason to confront its own limitations and resist the urge to take refuge in spurious religious beliefs. That urge, I argue, is linked to the propensity to evil, and uses religious orthodoxy to undermine moral religion. By clipping our dogmatic wings, the parerga encourage reason to face its own dialectical tendencies and direct its speculative interest to immanent practical use. This redirection counteracts the debilitating effects of the propensity to evil and plays a key role in our moral regeneration. To consider the parerga “derivative,” as Kant himself does, is therefore a grave mistake. 相似文献
4.
《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2012,44(2):170-179
AbstractThis journal recently published a special issue on Kant, evil, moral perfection and education. The essays included in the special issue discussed the vulnerably and imperfection of human beings and the role of education as facilitating such beings in their pursuit of moral perfection. The contribution of this article is to put forward a Kantian idea of hope as a response to the difficulty of holding imperfect agents to an impossibly high standard (perfect virtue). Hope plays an enabling role for human agents, mediating the seemingly unstable relationship between imperfect moral agents, characterised by radical evil, and their duty to elevate themselves to the idea of moral perfection in an uncertain world. As such, hope can be seen as a response to the editors’ call to bring attention to the need to work with the vulnerabilities and imperfections of human beings through education and social change. One practical way in which education can accomplish this task is through role modelling. A further contribution of this article is to advocate a Kantian idea of impure role modelling (the role model as imperfect but hopeful). 相似文献
5.
Paul Formosa 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2019,51(13):1325-1334
AbstractFor Kant, we cannot understand how to approach moral education without confronting the radical evil of humanity. But if we start out, as Kant thinks we do, from a morally corrupt state, how can we make moral progress? In response, I explore in this paper Kant’s gradualist and revolutionary accounts of moral progress. These differing accounts of progress raise two key questions in the literature: are these accounts compatible and which type of progress comes first? Against other views in the literature, I argue that gradual progress through a change of mores must come first and can gradually lead toward, as its ideal endpoint, a revolution in our disposition (or a change of heart) and the overthrowing of our radical evil. This has important implications for moral pedagogy. 相似文献
6.
Jeanine M. Grenberg 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2019,51(13):1335-1346
AbstractKant’s commitment to autonomy raises difficult questions about the very possibility of Kantian moral education, since appeal to external pedagogical guidance threatens to be in contradiction with autonomous virtue. Furthermore, moral education seems to involve getting good at something through repetition; but Kant seems to eschew the notion of repeated natural activity as antithetical to autonomy. Things become even trickier once we remember that Kant also views autonomous human beings as radically evil: we are capable of choosing rationally and autonomously, but, left to our own devices, that same capacity for reason might tempt us to choose only out of a concern to satisfy our happiness. We thus need a moral education which realizes autonomy while dodging the dual bullets of external natural forces and internal evil forces. Ultimately, his concerns about external natural forces and internal evil forces do not lead Kant to reject either moral education or a role for repeated activity in it. Rather, he advocates a carefully circumscribed appeal to repeated activities within a course of Socratic moral education focused on encouraging the student, subjectively and first-personally, to claim her autonomy, resulting in the cheerful and vigilant exercise of virtue as an aptitude. 相似文献
7.
Kate A. Moran 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2019,51(13):1361-1371
AbstractThis paper considers the role of ‘vices of culture’ in Immanuel Kant’s account of radical evil and education. I argue that Kant was keenly aware of a uniquely human tendency to allow a self-centered concern for status to misunderstand or co-opt the language of dignity and equal worth for its own purposes. This tendency lies at the root of the ‘vices of culture’ and ‘aggravated vices’ that Kant describes in the Religion and Doctrine of Virtue, respectively. When it comes to moral education, then, it will be crucial that the developing agent have a clear understanding of the shared dignity of rational agents and the particular duties (e.g. gratitude and beneficence) that are defined, in part, by their tendency to alter (a different kind of) status among agents. I argue that the casuistical questions that Kant attaches to these discussions in the Doctrine of Virtue are an example of a pedagogical device that might help pupils to overcome this tendency so closely associated with radical evil. 相似文献
8.
陈永典 《黄石理工学院学报(人文社科版)》2008,(5)
文章通过荀子与康德人性观的比较,指出两者的差异性在于:荀子认为,人性本恶,"化性起伪"的过程,就是性恶被人自身克服的过程,人性可以由恶转善,特别强调后天社会环境对人性的教育和改造的作用,主张通过圣人来制定礼义;康德的道德实现是建立在自由意志之上,他认为,人性是由自由意志决定的,是善恶相互调和的历史过程,人性的实现是善对恶的拯救过程。这两种人性观造成了中西人格特征的基本差异。 相似文献
9.
10.
Robert B. Louden 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2019,51(13):1308-1318
AbstractIn this essay, I try to make sense out of Kant’s unusual concept of grace, particularly as regards its uneasy relationship to education within the context of the effort to overcome evil. The key to the puzzle, I argue, lies in what I call ‘moral receptivity’. Part of education’s job is to make us morally receptive to grace by preparing us for its possibility. 相似文献
11.
崔雪茹 《北京教育学院学报》2017,31(2):40-48
王阳明知行合一说主要是针对明朝中期"不知而妄行"与"空想而不行"两种不良倾向,以及当时道德实践中先知后行、知而不行的弊病而提出的,其用意在于强调道德的实践性。王阳明知行合一说对于道德教育的意义有两点:一是人人心存善念,即澄清道德意念与纯化道德动机。二是人人践行善行,即以道德认知引导道德实践和以道德实践扩充"道德认知"。 相似文献
12.
尹怀斌 《湖州师范学院学报》2012,34(4):47-50,62
康德的道德哲学中包含有丰富的德性理论,德性论是其道德哲学研究的目的,具有最重要的地位。康德德性理论的核心问题包括:德性专属于人这种"有限的理性存在者",只有人才能够拥有德性;从德性与义务、内在自由、准则的关系中才能准确把握德性概念;德性是幸福的前提和条件,德性与"配享的幸福"的一致才是人类道德实践应当追求的目的。当代人们的道德实践应注重道德原则与品格担当的统一,反思个体幸福实践。 相似文献
13.
陈龙 《江苏广播电视大学学报》2014,(5):80-85
《城堡》的政治、社会、宗教寓意往往被人们首先识破和阐发,但在主人公K殚精竭虑的抗争背后,到底有着怎样的人格困惑和道德苦衷呢?在小说人物复杂交错的关系之间,K既彰显出策略的灵活和抗争的坚韧,又流露出对人性善恶的强烈关怀和介入,而这种道德关注正是《城堡》"抗争"主题的重要组成部分,也是K深陷其中并导致自己最终失败的缘由。小说中K为生存的意义与合法性而进行着悲剧性抗争,卡夫卡借助"目光"这一复杂而鲜明的象征性人格姿态以及K与几位重要女性的交往过程,倾心构筑出一种道德框架,并揭示出这种道德疑难与人物命运毁灭之间的关系。 相似文献
14.
曹海峰 《宜宾师范高等专科学校学报》2013,(9):43-46
康德的善良意志与孟子的性善论都力图通过肯定人有行善的先天内在能力,进一步推导出人类社会可以建立一个符合道德规范、符合善的要求的伦理体系.但二者也存在区别：康德的善良意志建立在理性基础上,从形而上学的角度试图建立一套无条件的、普遍客观而有效的道德法则,使人在善良意志的驱使下,通过遵守法则,实现善的价值;孟子则从生命本体角度认为人的本性是向善的,只要使人的本性得到自然生长,善的意向就会越来越强,不必刻意去寻求. 相似文献
15.
Viktor Johansson 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2019,51(5):519-530
AbstractThis paper aims to show how Emerson provides a reworking of Kantian understandings of moral education in young children’s Bildung. The article begins and ends by thinking of Emersonian self-cultivation as a form of improvisatory or wild Bildung. It explores the role of Bildung and self-cultivation in preschools through a philosophy that accounts for children’s ‘Wild wisdom’ by letting Emerson speak to Kant. The paper argues that Kant’s vision of Bildung essentially involves reason’s turn upon itself and that Emerson, particularly in how he is taken up by Cavell, shows that such a turn is already present in the processes of children inheriting, learning, and improvising with language. This improvisatory outlook on moral education is contrasted with common goals of moral education prescribed in early childhood education where the Swedish Curriculum for the Preschool Lpfö 98 is used as an example. 相似文献
16.
《Journal of moral education》2012,41(3):223-228
Abstract: It is claimed that there is a highly contingent and often misleading relationship between (a) giving reasons on a questionnaire and (b) genuine moral understanding. Also, many of the causal factors in shaping moral attitudes are irrelevant to their rational‐moral justification, thus creating a lack of harmony between the two. The solution is a balanced programme that gives equal stress to moral reasoning and to opportunities for relevant emotive and evaluative experience. Aspects of Kant and Schopenhauer are discussed in order to show how reason and feeling may be constructively interdependent in moral motivation. 相似文献
17.
李洪卫 《华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2007,39(3):25-28,41
自由意志在消极层面是非依赖性状态,从积极层面讲是自主选择的状态,与人在道义上的责任性联系在一起,是一种"二阶愿望"能力.康德在设定"自由意志"之存在的同时,却无力使人们将这种抽象的主体的自由的"规定"真正在人身付诸实现,关键在于他还没有将这种道德意志真正内在化,与生命自身的良知性的动力统一起来.在王阳明那里,道德理性与人的内在的道德情感本体是同一的,良知本体的自我裁断和自我意志冲动,使人的身心之间、知行之间的冲突协调并成为一个统一体,使道德理性在人身现实化,是为自由意志的真正实现. 相似文献
18.
纳撒尼尔·霍桑乃19世纪美国文坛最重要的小说家之一。他的短篇小说集《故事重述》中广为人知的一个主题是对于人性之“恶”的解读。在《优雅少年》中,“恶”有两层含义：其一,它代表那个时代狂热宗教激情驱使下的宗教迫害或是宗教狂热;其二,它代表人性固有的弱点。霍桑认为,无论个人还是群体,只有掌握了关于黑暗的知识,即了解了自身的弱点,才能使自身趋于完善。这则故事不仅鞭笞了殖民地早期清教对人思想的禁锢,而且还给19世纪的美国盲目自信的弊病敲响了警钟。 相似文献
19.
罗松涛 《北京师范大学学报(社会科学版)》2011,(2):98-103
康德的道德哲学蕴含着丰富的人学思想。在笔者看来,德性至上是康德人学思想的核心。从源于实践理性的自律出发,康德将德性、实践理性与意志自由有机统一,并为每一个有理性者提出了"以人性为目的"这一道德实践意义上的绝对律令。因此,强调德性至上的康德人学,其基础是实践理性,其目的则是人类自由,有限的理性存在者(人)由此成为道德王国的自我决断者。在这一意义上,康德人学正是西方启蒙思想的精华。 相似文献
20.
市场经济与伦理道德的几个理论问题 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
陈鹏 《首都师范大学学报(社会科学版)》1996,(4)
对市场行为的认识要摆脱单一的道德尺度，一方面，对市场行为的伦理评估要超越简单的善恶二分法，合法的市场私利行为是正当的、自然的；另一方面，对市场行为的社会分析要超越唯道德或泛道德主义，市场文化有许多独立于伦理道德的人文价值。对于目前的道德腐败，不能简单地归咎于市场经济与个人利欲，而要全面客观地分析影响社会道德状况的各种社会因素。改善社会道德状况是一项复杂的社会综合治理工程。 相似文献