| 考虑关税和补贴的跨国生产业务外包决策与优化 |
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| 引用本文： | 伏开放,陈志祥.考虑关税和补贴的跨国生产业务外包决策与优化[J].科技管理研究,2021,41(18):205-213. |
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| 作者姓名： | 伏开放 陈志祥 |
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| 作者单位： | 广东金融学院战略新兴产业共性技术政策与管理创新研究中心,广东广州 510521;中山大学管理学院,广东广州 510275 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
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| 摘 要： | 在随机需求下研究由一个境外集成制造商、一个国际运输服务提供商和一个供应商构成的跨国生产业务外包决策问题.考虑制造商所在国存在进口关税、供应商所在国存在补贴,定量分析制造成本、运输成本、关税成本和出口补贴对跨国生产业务外包决策的影响;依次建立三级独立主从决策模型和联盟主从决策模型,分析收益分享和成本分担对决策的影响.结果 表明对于跨国生产业务外包决策与优化,当关税成本计算考虑运输费用和保险费用时,跨国生产业务难以实现协调;联盟博弈可以压缩博弈层级进而改善跨国供应链绩效;关税税率提升使各方利润和整体利润减少,削弱供应商的领导地位、加强制造商的地位;出口补贴增加可以提高各方利润及整体利润,加强供应商的领导地位、削弱制造商的地位;各方仅进行收益分享可以改善供应链利润,但仅进行关税或运输成本分担会恶化供应链利润.
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| 关 键 词： | 跨国供应链 关税分担 出口补贴 博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2021/1/6 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2021/9/21 0:00:00 |
Game and optimization of transnational production outsourcing considering tariff and subsidy |
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| Fu Kaifang,Chen Zhixiang.Game and optimization of transnational production outsourcing considering tariff and subsidy[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2021,41(18):205-213. |
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| Authors: | Fu Kaifang Chen Zhixiang |
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| Abstract: | Based on the stochastic demand, this paper studies the outsourcing decision-making problem of global production supply chain, which is composed of an overseas integrated manufacturer, an international transportation service provider and a local parts supplier. The influences of manufacturing cost, transportation cost, and tariff cost and export subsidy on the decision-making of global production are analyzed quantitatively. The independent master-slave decision-making model and alliance master-slave decision-making model are established successively, and the impact of income analysis and cost sharing on decision-making is analyzed. The research shows that the increase of the cost of any link in the global supply chain will lead to the decrease of the order quantity of overseas integrated manufacturers. Alliance game can improve the performance of global supply chain. The increase of tariff rate will reduce the profits of all parties and the overall profits of the global supply chain, and weaken the leading position of suppliers in the global supply chain. Export subsidies will increase the profits of all parties and the overall profits of the global supply chain, and strengthen the position of suppliers in the global supply chain. Revenue sharing can improve the performance of the global supply chain. However, only tariff cost sharing or transportation cost sharing cannot improve the performance of the whole global supply chain, but will worsen the performance of the global supply chain. |
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| Keywords: | GlobalSsupply chain tariff export subsidy game theory |
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